The low fertility of Western industrial nations is likely to become a permanent condition; in the absence of immigration, populations with below-replacement fertility will eventually decline in size. But at the same time fertility is declining, international migration to the West is accelerating. Legal immigration to the United States rose from about 300,000 per year in the early 1960s to more than 570,000 per year in the early 1980s; the United States is now accepting nearly twice as many immigrants and refugees as all other nations combined. Immigration from Third World countries contributes to population growth in the following ways: (1) the addition of the immigrants themselves; and (2) immigrant fertility, which is often higher than native fertility. A stationary population, characterized by a fixed size and an unchanging age-sex structure, is forming in the United States; the indigenous population is diminishing, and a new population of ,immigrants and their descendants is emerging. This is evidenced by America's Hispanic population, which is growing three times faster than the total population. The potential for further change in the ethnic, racial, and linguistic balances of national populations is perhaps greater in Europe than in the United States. Concerns have been raised that immigrants are failing to adapt to the culture of their new home: increasingly immigrants are the focus of tension and the targets of abuse and violence. Recommendations for public policy are suggested.
For example, prior to 1972, fertility rates in the United States were consistently above replacement. The only exception occurred during.a few years in the middle of the Great Depression, and with the recrudescence in native fertility following the Second World War this brief episode was quickly forgotten. After the war, U.S. period total fertility rates peaked during the Fertility levels in other industrial countries have also declined precipitously. A review of these trends can be found in Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) and in Wattenberg and Zinsmeistar (1985) . By the mid-1980s total fertility rates averaged 1.8 in northern Europe and 1.5 in western Europe, including levels as low as 1.3 in Denmark and West Germany (Population Reference Bureau, 1986) . Moreover, there seems to be little hope for a sharp reversal anytime soon.
At the same time fertility was declining, international migration to the West--much of it from Third World countries was accelerating, both in terms of absolute numbers and as a proportion of total population growth. Though not recognized as such at the time, these international movements were to become one of the most important demographic changes of the period (Teitelbaum. and Winter, 1985) . Immigration to Great Britain and the Netherlands was spurred by decolonization, to Sweden, France, and West Germany by various guest worker programs designed to alleviate labor shortages in the 1950s and 1960s, and to the United States and Canada by immigration reforms in the 1960s that ended discrimination against entrants from non-European countries.
In 1970 the foreign-born share of total U.S. population equalled 4.7 percent, but low birth rates coupled with growing levels of immigration in the following decade boosted the share to 6.2 percent by 1980 (Economic Report of the President, 1986) . Legal immigration to the United States rose from about 2 300,000 per year in the early 1960s to more than 570,000 per year in the first half of the 1980s (Bouvier and Gardner, 1986) , and recent estimates suggest that the United States is now accepting nearly twice as many immigrants and refugees as all other nations combined (Lamm and Imhoff, 1989) . The contribution of net immigration to total U.S. population growth also accelerated over this period, from 12.5 percent in 1960-64 to 28.4 percent by 1980-85 (Bouvier and Gardner, 1986 Africans (Carlson, 1985) .
2. Data for 1980-85 include an allowance of 200,000 per year for net illegal immigration, not included in earlier years, and estimated legal emigration is assumed to f3 160,000 a year, increased from 36,000 a year for earlier data.
3 Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) draw attention to the demographic significance of low fertility in the presence of immigration:
The convergence of the baby bust with the growth of international migration has led to a new demographic phenomenon of great relevance to debates about population decline. Fut simply, the combination of record-low fertility and high immigration (especially from countries of higher fertility than the receiving countries) means that immigration must account for a large and increasing proportion of Western population growth (pp. 91-92).
The demographic dilemma facing western industrial nations becomes clear if one assumes that their low fertility is likely to become a permanent condition.
In the absence of immigration, populations with continued below-replacement fertility will eventually decline in size, but depending upon their current age structures such declines may begin soon or be delayed until well into the 21st century. And if immigration is encouraged for the sake of numerical stability, it often leads to changes in the ethnic, racial, cultural, and linguistic composition of populations changes that some people believe are sources of concern. In western Europe, where these compositional changes are occurring more quickly than in the United States, concern has frequently been intensified, especially where traditional white majority populations have felt threatened by the prospect of being displaced by other peoples. For this reason, Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) comment: "Recent developments in FLance and Germany once more highlight the extent to which the matters raised (here) go far deeper than the administrative and technical, touching sensitive and important political issues likely to cloud and complicate present and future policy debates" (p. 120).
Demographic Implications
Some writers disagree that low fertility in industrial countries is here to stay. Easterlin (1980) , for example, argues that fertility will rise in the 4 1990s when the small baby bust cohorts of the late 1960s and 1970s enter adulthood. And Ahlburg (1983) , using the Easterlin model, predicts a climb from 3.3 million U.S. births in 1978 to 4.6 million in 1997.
Most demographers, however, expect that fertility in developed countries will remain low. McIntosh (1983) attributes these trends to "the convergence of a number of social revolutions, each of which exerts an antinatalist effect" (p. 229). Isolating the rising economic costs and declining economic rewards of childrearing, Huber (1980) and Folbre (1983) argue that fertility is likely to go even lower. The prevailing consensus in the United States, and by extension perhaps in other western industrial nations as well, is summed up best by Westoff (1986):
When we consider [the basic social forces that underlay the historical decline in fertility] and observe that fertility in the United States has been declining for two centuries (with the exception of the baby boom, which may indeed have been the demographic aberration), and when we see similar and even more extreme declines in other Western countries in recent decades, the conclusion that fertility appears destined to remain low seems inescapable. The greater uncertainty appears to be how low it will fall (pp. 558 -559).
Populations will eventually decrease in size if they exhibit below replacement fertility and zero net immigration over a long period. For 3. It is worth mentioning that, in western industrial democracies, government efforts to reverse undesirable fertility trends have been notably unsuccessful. Many of these countries have progressive systems of child allowances, designed partly with a pronatalist intent. In West Germany, for example, the monthly child allowance in 1932 was DM 50 for the first child, DM 100 for the second child, DM 220 for the third, and DM 240 for the fourth or higherorder child (Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985) . Despite this program, fertility in West Germany is the lowest in the world. Nor are western nations likely to do much more in the future. With reference to France, Sweden, and West Germany, McIntosh (1983) observes that "the evidence suggests that the 1980s are unlikely to see the adoption of strong, broadly based and coordinated policies intended to stimulate fertility" (p. 224). Part of her reasoning is that an effective program would be prohibitively expensive.
In addition, a "muted sense of nationalism" has prevented any strong feeling of urgency over the need to stimulate the birth rate.
example, when the 1982 U.S. population is projected assuming zero net immigration, an ultimate total fertility rate of 1.9 lifetime births per woman, and life expectancy at birth reaching 81.0 years in 2080, total population size grows from 232.1 million persons in 1982 to a maximum of 275.4 million by the year 2025, and then begins a long-term decline (Spencer, 1984) .
In contrast, a population that has fixed mortality and below-replacement fertility together with a constant (and nonzero) annual number and age-sex composition of net immigrants will eventually become a stationary perilation with a fixed size and an unchanging age-sex structure (Espenshade, Bouvier, and Arthur, 1982) . The size and other characteristics of this stationary population do not depend on the size or the age-sex structure of the initial population, but only on the underlying assumptions about future fertility, mortality, and immigration.
With a total fertility rate of 2.0 and 1 million annual net immigrants, U.S.
population size would eventually reach a stationary total of nearly 1.2 billion persons. On the other hand, its ultimate size would be just 36.3 million with a total fertility rate of 1.5 and 250,000 annual net immigrants.4
While a stationary population is forming, the indigenous population diminishes because its fertility rates are too low to replace it, and a new population of immigrants and their descendants emerges. This new population consists of a series of smaller stationary populations one of immigrants, one of their first-generation native-born descendants, one of their second-4. These and other tabulated data for a range of fertility and immigration assumptions are contained in Espenshade (1983) . Different combinations of fertility and immigration levels can lead to the same size for a stationary population. For a discussion of this issue, see . (Spencer, 1984) . These compositional changes would occur more quickly if immigrants and their near-term descendants were assumed to have higher fertility than the "native" population.7
5. A more detailed discussion of the dynamic processes of population change that accompany the introduction of immigration and low fertility can be found in Espenshade (1987) .
6. Of course, by the year 2080 "Hispanic" may not have the same social meaning as today, just as "Italian" or "Jewish" ethnic groups are perceived quite differently today than 100 years ago. To some extent the changing social definition of former immigrant groups can be attributed to the character of the adjustments that immigrants and their descendants made to life in the United States.
7. To keep things in perspective, Gibson (1975) showed that an estimated 27.8 percent of the 1970 total U.S. population was post-1870 surviving immigrants and their descendants. On the other hand, immigration and natural increase among immigrants are projected under the middle series to account for 80.1 percent of total U.S. population growth between 1982 and 2080 (Spencer, 1984) ; the comparable figure for the 100 years from 1870 to 1970 is 34.5 (Footnote 7 Continued on Next Page 7 Social Issues If fertility,in western industrial nations remains low, three broad conclusions follow. First, although immigration-related changes in the ethnic, racial, and linguistic balances of both the U.S. and western European populations arc already underway, in the short run at least, the potential for further change in these and other compositional aspects of national populations is perhaps greater in Europe than in the United States not only because most Europeall populations are less diverse to begin with but also because Europe did not experience a baby boom after the Second World War that matched that in the United States, either in terms of magnitude or duration. As a result, European populations do not have age distributions with the same degree of built-in momentum for future population growth, and therefore they lack a "protective mantle of natural increase" that softens and to some extent obscures recompositional trends tied to immigration.8 Second, countries with below-replacement fertility need immigrants--if not now, then eventually if they do not wish to decline. Without immigrants, many populations in the West would soon stop growing, temporarily reach zero population growth, and then begin to decline. Not only would population decline bring with it sharply older age distributions and correspondingly higher old-age dependency burdens than the ones that exist presently, it could also slow and possibly even reverse the trend of increasing specialization of human capital thereby making the management of economic growth more uncertain.
(Footnote 7 Continued from Previous Page) percent (Gibson, 1975) . The sharp contrast between the two periods is explained by the substantially lower fertility assumed throughout the next century.
8. To my knowledge, this "protective mantle" metaphor owes its origins to Peter Morrison (1978 taken as the "starting" population and if immigration continues, the starting population and its later descendants will diminish and be replaced by a new population of immigrants and their descendants. But as long as the level and composition of the immigrant flows do not change, there will be no apparent change in either the size or the composition of the overall stationary population. The fact that one population is being replaced by another will hardly be noticed and is therefore unlikely to arouse policy concerns.
9. Coale (1986) has shown that the main effect of continued immigration"through the year 2100 is to boost the size of the U.S. population over what it would be without immigration. Immigration has a smaller effect in cheaing the -ling process that accompanies prolonged below-replacement fertility. In the latter two circumstances, population replacement can be a source of growing concern. Carlson (1986) It is with grave concern that we observe the infiltration of the German nation by millionfold waves of foreigners and their families, the infiltration of our language, our culture, and our national characteristics by foreign influences....The integration of large masses of non-German foreigners and the preservation of our nation thus cannot be achieved simultaneously; it will lead to the well-known ethnic catastrophes of multicultural societies....For the Federal Republic of Germany, which is one of the most heavily populated countries of the world, the return of the foreigners to their native lands will provide ecological as well as social relief (Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985, pp. 176-178) .
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Negative reaction to immigrants has been more extreme in France where it became a political issue in the Parliamentary elections in March 1986.
JeanMarie Le Pen, an outspoken candidate for the far-right National Front, blamed immigrants for taking away jobs and causing crime, and campaigned on the slogan "2 million immigrants equals 2 million unemployed" (Echikson, 1986, p. 13 ).
Having scored just 1 percent in public opinion polls a few years ago, the National Front received 9.7 percent of the vote in the Parliamentary elections and succeeded in moving the immigrant question to the top of the national agenda. In an interview, Le Pen was quoted as saying, "The problem for Europe is a question of survival as a civilization. If we do not reverse the current of immigration, we will be swept away" (Markham, 1986, p. A6) .
Similar accounts could be recited in other countries. But whether these stories refer to Asians in Canada, Caribbean blacks in Great Britain, or Surinamese in Holland, the theme is almost always the same. Increasingly, immigrants are the focus of tension and often the targets of abuse and violence. Many whites, fearful of becoming a minority in their own country, share Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's concern about being "swamped" by outsiders (Markham, 1986) . Fears arise not only because of the large volume of immigration and its contribution to population growth, but also because immigrants and their offspring often have fertility rates higher than those of the indigenous population. The fact that many of these newer immigrants are culturally and ethnically distinct from the native population also complicates policy alternatives (Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985) .
The preceding discussion delineates the emerging dilemma confronting policy makers in developed countries with immigration and low fertility. Because fertility rates are at levels that are insufficient to replace these 12 populations in the long run and because there is little hope that they will rise above replacement anytime soon, immigrants will be needed for their contribution to demographic stability. At the same time, the public's dissatisfaction over the presence of a large and growing immigrant community typically swells as the proportion of total population growth attributable to immigration rises. It is for this reason that many writers doubt that an "immigration solution" to fears of population decline will prove to be politically acceptable. Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) , for example, conclude:
"It seems doubtful, therefore, whether large-scale immigration can ever serve as a politically viable response to declining population over a considerable period of years, unless the immigrant streams are considered similar in character to the indigenous population" (p. 150).
Recommendations
Because it is federal policy to admit large numbers of new immigrants each year, the U.S. government should at the same time be paying more attention to what happens to immigrants once they have entered the country, to how well immigrants are able to adjust to life in the United States, and to what can be done by the host population to facilitate this adjustment. Our society should take steps to ensure that a situation does not develop where minority immigrant populations comprise a permanent underclass existing "at the margins of white tolerance" (Markham, 1986 
